Introduction
In the landmark 2015 decision Obergefell v. Hodges, the US Supreme Court found that the Fourteenth Amendment requires all states to recognize gay marriage. While this decision is generally portrayed as the culmination of a long domestic struggle, US courts are latecomers to marriage equality and are following a global trend wherein national laws regulating homosexuality have become increasingly liberal since 1945. World society 1 (WS) scholars have identified this as a case of increasing isomorphism (Frank, Boutcher, and Camp 2009) . However, an emerging countertrend has not yet been analyzed in the WS literature-over the past, decade many countries' laws regulating homosexuality have become more repressive (see figure 1, background section). This divergence suggests a counter-movement may be being institutionalized within world society and prompts us to investigate if polarization might also influence public opinion. If public opinion is becoming increasingly liberal even within states that are adopting increasingly repressive laws, then divergence among national laws may be a temporary departure from the liberalizing trend. However, if public opinion and state positions are moving in tandem, then international divergence concerning homosexuality may last longer.
This article examines whether liberalism's dominance within world culture is breaking down. We first update WS literature by showing evidence of international divergence in national laws regulating homosexuality. Second, we examine acceptance of homosexuality in national public opinion surveys via three steps: we first examine how rival world models diffuse via ties to world society and individual characteristics, we then consider the effects of polarizing influences, and finally, we investigate divergence over time for different social groups and contexts. 2 International comparative studies linking individuals to world society have mostly assumed that world society is homogeneous (although allowing for conflicts within an overarching liberal framework, see Meyer et al. [1997] ; Pierotti [2013] ; Velitchkova [2015] ). However, scholars such as Jason Beckfield (2010) have shown that global society consists of different regional nodes and densities and thus can be considered heterogeneous. This idea is consistent with earlier studies showing that Europe and Asia are organized around regional core states (Germany and Japan) that act as conduits of US influence, while other regions, like South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, are more autonomous (Katzenstein 2005) . Since state policies concerning homosexuality appear to be influenced by rival international norms, this case allows us to consider norm diffusion in a heterogeneous context. Moreover, since we know that many new issues polarize national opinion when first raised in the public sphere, this case allows us to examine whether "take-off" issues might function similarly in international debates (Ayoub 2016; Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Dorf and Tarrow 2014) .
We also build on recent efforts to reconnect WS theory to its microsociological roots (Boyle, Minzee, and Longhofer 2015; Hadler 2012; Hallett 2010; Pierotti 2013; Velitchkova 2015; Zhou 2013) . This work revisits earlier assumptions that world society influences individuals via an exposure model, or alternatively, that the density of individual or national memberships of international organizations is an adequate proxy for connection to world society (see for example Givens and Jorgenson [2013] ; Hadler [2016] ; Hironaka [2014] ; Marquart-Pyatt [2012] ). By studying a case where respondents may be embedded in conflicting institutional logics (e.g., secular-liberal and religiousconservative contexts), we extend this research on micro-level processes.
Finally, our research methods bridge the gap between longitudinal time-series and cross-sectional survey research. We utilize a cross-national, longitudinal study to assess how national-level differences in ties to world society and national growth patterns shape the effect of global ideas, and how these influences are mediated by individual characteristics. We thus go beyond earlier work that considered different individual-level processes within countries but ignored societal links to world society (see Boyle et al. [2002] ; Pierotti [2013] ; Velitchkova [2015] ) or that examined societal links to world society via crossnational studies, but did not capture changes over time (see Givens and Jorgenson [2013] ; Zhou [2013] ).
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews recent international divergence in state regulation of homosexuality. Next, we discuss the macro-micro link within world society, propose ways to improve this conceptualization, and review alternative theories considering economic and political processes. A brief outline of our hypotheses and research logic precedes a section on data and methods that introduces the PEW survey data, the multilevel strategies, and the coding of our variables. The results section reviews levels of acceptance in 30 countries and presents results of various regression analyses. The discussion and conclusions identify different factors that influence the magnitude and direction of change, and outline limitations of our analysis.
Background: Homosexuality and Polarized World Society
WS theorists have emphasized how a global network of governmental and nongovernmental institutions has promoted ideas that constitute an emerging "world culture" and demonstrated growing global homogeneity in national regulations (Boli and Thomas 1999; Longhofer et al. 2016; Schofer et al. 2012) . For example, David Frank, Steven Boutcher, and Bayliss Camp demonstrate how world culture has promoted institutionalization of "sharply individualized conceptions of society and sex" (2009, 123 ; see also Frank and Moss [2017] ). These shifts include trends toward liberalizing laws criminalizing same-sex sexual contact and efforts to protect "sexual orientation and gender identity" (SOGI) under international human rights instruments (see also Frank and McEneaney [1999] ).
Frank, Boutcher, and Camp emphasize that regulation and discourses surrounding sex are deeply interconnected (i.e., there are coherent patterns among attitudes to homosexuality, marriage, adultery, sex-work, etc.) and that the global-institutional environment may influence national shifts in attitudes and policy. These insights may continue to be relevant in a heterogeneous world society. For example, we observe that some recent moves to increase punishment of homosexuality have arisen in conjunction with other regulations of personal life through adoption of Sharia law. We focus on attitudes to homosexuality exclusively, because we expect that the high-profile international debate on homosexuality and human rights has raised this issue's salience. We anticipate that if divisions within world society influence national public opinion, these effects will be strongest where salience is high.
The critique of WS literature, that it fails to adequately account for heterogeneity or the persistence of illiberal challenges, appears increasingly relevant in the context of laws governing sexuality (Ayoub 2014 (Ayoub , 2015 (Ayoub , 2016 Cobb 2014; Eisenstadt 2000) . For example, the question of whether human rights protections should cover sexual orientation has become increasingly divisive within international human rights bodies; in 2012, it prompted a mass walkout from a UN Human Rights Council Meeting. In order to assess whether polarization in states' international rhetoric reflects polarization in domestic legal regulation, we have updated Frank, Camp, and Boutcher (2010) 's post-1945 longitudinal study of sodomy laws to cover the period 2006-2014. 3 The original study found that 90 percent of all changes between 1945 and 2005 were in a liberalizing direction. Only eight countries increased penalties across the 60-year period, and illiberal changes, such as Gabon in 1969 and Cameroon in 1972, usually followed regime change and were justified as efforts to localize colonial penal codes (Frank, Boutcher, and Camp 2009, 130) . By contrast, changes since 2005 follow a different pattern (see figure 1) . Given that the dominant liberalizing trend has always been surrounded by considerable noise (e.g., Spain criminalized and decriminalized homosexuality twice during the twentieth century), we should be cautious about interpreting an apparent countertrend. However, in the nine years following 2005, more states increased penalties on homosexuality (nine: Burundi, Brunei, Gambia, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, South Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe 4 ) than had increased penalties in the previous 60 years (eight), and reforms increasing penalties nearly equaled those decreasing them.
Trends surrounding regulation of sexuality are more complex than this illustration suggests. Were we to graph states that recognize gay marriage (22 in 2016; Netherlands was the first in 2001; see Kollman [2007] ), that prohibit discrimination in employment (71 in 2015; Norway passed the first national nondiscrimination laws in 1981), or in which homosexual sex is not criminalized (121 in June 2016, versus 73 in which it is criminalized), we could demonstrate a strong continuing liberalizing trend (ILGA 2016) . Conversely, graphing countries that have recently criminalized "promotion of homosexuality" (Russian Federation, Algeria, Lithuania, Nigeria, and Kyrgyzstan) or in which a subnational jurisdiction increased penalties (e.g., Indonesia and Nigeria), we could point to a wider illiberal counter-trend (ILGA 2016) .
These trends suggest that world society may be influenced by twin countervailing forces rather than divided into two blocks. Some states have responded to both world society trends-for example, in 2010 Botswana prohibited discrimination in employment even though homosexual sex is punishable with up to seven years in jail; India and Pakistan both criminalize homosexual sex but (along with Nepal and Bangladesh) have recently granted legal recognition to a third gender; homosexual sex was decriminalized in the Russian Federation in 1993, yet "promotion of homosexuality" was outlawed in 2013, and under Vladimir Putin the country has become a key international activist against all moves to connect sexual orientation and human rights (Horvath 2016) . Given evidence that homosexuality often triggers public backlashes when it is addressed in the public sphere for the first time (Ayoub 2016; Dorf and Tarrow 2014) , the illiberal, global counter-trend may potentially reflect simultaneous national backlashes that will eventually subside.
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The previous section shows that we cannot assume a single world model or a homogeneous world society. Some international relations scholars have identified disputation over SOGI and human rights as a paradigmatic case of "international norm polarization." Jonathan Symons and Dennis Altman describe a situation wherein "socializing pressures pull states toward compliance with rival norms." While some states continue to view sexuality as a legitimate subject of criminal regulation, a newly dominant WS norm suggests that states should recognize SOGI as subjects of human rights protection. More recently, opposing states have asserted that human rights claims can only be valid if they reflect the "traditional values of humankind" (Symons and Altman 2015, 61) . It seems that rival world models are associated with each of these international norms. Whereas a "liberal" world model promotes acceptance of sexual and gender diversity, a "traditional" model views homosexuality as undesirable and a legitimate target of criminal or social sanctions. It is unclear whether the contemporary debate is an interim deviation from a longer-term liberalizing trend, or marks a move toward "multiple modernities" (Eisenstadt 2000) .
International divisions have been apparent at least since debates in 1993 over whether the "International Lesbian and Gay Association" should be granted official consultative status within the United Nations Economic and Social Council (Sanders 1996) . By the early 1990s, a new candidate norm of making SOGI subjects of rights protection was emerging in parts of Europe and South America. However, for as long as the United States sided with conservative states, disagreements were low profile and the older illiberal norm remained dominant. In 1999, when the UN General Assembly's Third Committee added specific reference to killings on the basis of "sexual orientation" (later SOGI) to a regular resolution condemning extrajudicial killings, the contested vote sparked no major controversy (ISHR 2011, 2 Bob [2012] ). For example, since 1997 the World Congress of Families has promoted "traditional family values" through international conferences and activism, has built strong alliances with political and religious groups in Russia, and has promoted anti-homosexual laws within many states (Altman and Symons 2016) . Moreover, the Russian Federation has also supported NGOs and conferences opposing the SOGI human rights agenda in Europe (Horvath 2016) .
In summary, research into the link between world models and individual attitudes must consider evidence that world society is divided between "liberal" and "traditional" world models concerning homosexuality. This divide is reflected in state voting patterns at UN meetings, in the formation of the UN's LGBT Core Group, in the OIC's organized resistance to SOGI rights, and in domestic laws that criminalize homosexuality or, conversely, prohibit discrimination. We will return to these polarizing forces when formulating hypotheses after examining how WS influences public opinion.
How World Society influences public opinion
WS theory asserts that individuals are influenced by world models that often take precedence over local norms (Meyer 2010; Schofer et al. 2012) . Before dissecting these claims, we first explain why we anticipate that states' international voting and rhetoric concerning SOGI might influence domestic opinion (presumably domestic opinion will also influence states' international alignment). One possibility is suggested by John Zaller's theory of elite influence over public opinion (1992) . Zaller suggests that people often take cues from elite political figures who share their general dispositions when formulating responses to new issues. Zaller stresses that public opinion is not simply controlled by the state or politicians (1992, 268-70 and 327-29) . However, if states' positions in international debates correspond with leaders' domestic rhetoric, then international debates may influence public attitudes. In addition, research on how political leaders influence public opinion suggests that "issue priming" (raising an issue's prominence) may be an important mechanism (Cohen 1995; Druckman and Holmes 2004) .
WS assumes that actors who are more exposed to global ideas will be more likely to adopt them (Jepperson 1991; Meyer 2010) . WS scholars thus anticipate that the density of INGO membership in a country is a good proxy for world culture's influence on actors. Various studies have shown that increased INGO presence correlates with increased acceptance of LGBT groups (Hadler 2012) , increased concerns about the environment (Givens and Jorgenson 2013) , and greater support for international human rights (Zhou 2013) . In summary, WS theorists generally hypothesize that increased ties between a country and world society promote greater alignment between homogeneous world models, individual attitudes, and public opinion. Our starting hypothesis is thus:
H1. Ties between a country and WS, as measured by INGO membership, increase acceptance of homosexuality.
As discussed earlier, WS seems characterized by polarized world models concerning homosexuality. "Polarization"-a term we draw from social psychology -describes a process by which opinion in a social group shifts toward a more extreme position. In general, individual opinions within a social group tend to shift toward the median of individual members' opinions. However, group opinion commonly shifts to emphasize distinct group identity if the difference between in-group attitudes and those of a particular out-group becomes salient (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; McCright and Dunlap 2011 ; see also Sunstein [2002] ). For example, if a division between Orthodox and non-Orthodox Latvian people were to become highly salient to group identity, and if acceptance of homosexuality were to become associated with this division, we might anticipate the mean opinion of each group to shift in opposite directions.
This understanding of polarization qualifies the standard WS hypothesis on the effects of ties to world society discussed above, and suggests at least two paths through which divergence in world society might influence public opinion. First, if the social psychological process of polarization operates at a national level, we might see attitudes to homosexuality shifting in opposing directions between states that have been protagonists in international debates (e.g., the Russian Federation and the United States). Second, if polarization over homosexuality is occurring within specific religious communities, we might anticipate adherents of religions that publicly emphasize opposition to SOGI rights and states in which these religions are dominant to shift toward reduced acceptance.
Thus, our second move is to test for polarizing forces through hypotheses that a state's alignment in international debates over homosexuality and relevant domestic criminal laws will shape public opinion. We posit two hypotheses:
H2a. Acceptance is lower in states that criminalize homosexuality.
H2b. Over time, acceptance shifts in line with a country's international voting record and thus leads to an increasing polarization.
As for the effects on individuals, we need to consider that exposure to world models differs across social groups; education, age, and residency are frequently seen as the main mediators of exposure (see Hadler [2016] ; Pierotti [2013] ; Velitchkova [2015] ; Zhou [2013] ). Education is important as world models have been increasingly incorporated into curricula. The appearance of environmentalism in school textbooks globally is one example (Bromley, Meyer, and Ramirez 2011) . Exposure should also be higher among younger cohorts, as world models have only recently linked sexuality to human rights. We thus hypothesize:
H3a. Education has positive effects on acceptance and age negative ones.
Finally, the understanding of actors as mere script followers has been criticized as overly simplistic since institutions are interpreted, modified, and challenged in local interaction (Hallett 2010; Hallett and Ventresca 2006) . For example, Hallett's (2010) ethnographic research shows how a newly hired public school principal faces various obstacles and conflicts when seeking to implement the world model of "accountability." Similarly, Velitchkova (2015) emphasizes that actors can be part of different micro-level logics that variously support and oppose world models. Her study on political violence confirms that individuals who are part of micro-level logics that reject the world model of non-violence are more inclined to use political violence. We thus hypothesize:
H3b. Embedding in micro-institutional logics and identification with religious groups that oppose liberal world models has negative effects.
Furthermore, if the effects of ties to world society via INGOs are transmitted via individual characteristics, we should be able to observe mediation effects and thus hypothesize:
H3c. The effects of world models are mediated by individual characteristics.
Finally, we also need to consider changes over time and the possibility that the effects of individual characteristics may align with the locally dominant world models. We measure which world model is dominant in a country with reference to both average public acceptance of homosexuality and the state's international voting pattern. Education, for example, may shift individual views toward or against acceptance depending on whether a state aligns with the liberal or traditional world model. Similarly, INGOs will likely have different impacts in more liberal and more traditional contexts.
H4a. Over time, the effects of individual-level variables will align with nationally dominant world models.
H4b. The effects of INGOs align with nationally dominant world models.
Research strategy, alternative views, and controls
We adopt the following research strategy. First, we test WS theorists' common assumption that increased ties between a country and world society result in greater alignment between attitudes and world models. Next, we consider individual characteristics and test the WS notion that characteristics such as education lead to more exposure and that embedding in micro-institutional logics can enhance or hinder world models' diffusion.
When studying how world society and polarizing forces influence individual acceptance of homosexuality, we also consider alternative theories and control for the following country-level factors: social globalization is strongly related to the WS concept but measures the social connectedness of societies via the spread of information, ideas, and people (Dreher 2006) ; levels of democratization may influence acceptance, as experience balancing demands from different social groups may foster social tolerance (Hadler 2012; Rohrschneider 1999) ; economic wealth may promote tolerance either by supporting "postmaterialist value change" (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart, Ponarin, Inglehart 2017) or by reducing group-competition for limited resources (Blumer 1958; Quillian 1995) and perceived threats from out-groups (Persell, Green, and Gurevich 2001) ; and dominant societal religion may be significant, because involvement in some religious communities is linked to low acceptance and because religious majorities have cultural influence on non-religious members of national communities (Doebler 2015; Kenneavy 2012; Putnam and Campbell 2010) . In addition to these country variables, we also control for the individual characteristics gender and income. Previous research has shown that women and more affluent respondents are generally more tolerant toward homosexuality, although there is some cross-cultural variation and debate over the drivers of gender difference (Hadler 2012; Slenders, Sieben, and Verbakel 2013) .
Data
Our analysis is based on the Global Attitudes Survey from the Pew Research Center, which is available at www.pewglobal.org. We selected this source as it offers good coverage of our dependent variable, a broad geographical scope, and allows cross-sectional longitudinal analyses. 6 Our analysis includes all countries that fielded this survey in 2013 and in at least one of the 2007 and 2002 waves (see table 1 for an overview of the included countries; note that in Ukraine only 2011 data is available).
7 These three waves create a total sample size of 72,374 respondents, with an average sample size of 894 respondents per country and wave. Interviews were conducted via telephone or face-to-face. Weights are provided for many countries to correct for unequal selection probabilities as well as for sociodemographic characteristics, with the goal to achieve nationally representative samples. Our dependent variable, acceptance of homosexuality, is captured by responses to the statement "Which one of these statements comes closest to your opinion, number 1 or number 2? #1-Homosexuality should be accepted by society or #2-Homosexuality should not be accepted by society." Respondents who selected the first option are coded as "1," accepting, and all other respondents as "0." Cross-cultural differences in understandings of the term "homosexuality" are an unavoidable limitation of this data. The following individual variables are included (see table A1 for descriptive statistics): age and education are considered proxies for exposure to global ideas; religious denomination is used to capture embeddedness in micro-institutional logics as expressed in H3a-c and H4a. Gender and income are used as controls. Age is measured in years, gender as a categorical variable, education as highest level of education achieved, and income as household income. Education was asked in country-specific durations, and income in country-specific currencies. We standardized both variables by dividing them by the national median values. In addition, a dummy variable and interaction with the main term is included for respondents who did not report household income. This method absorbs the 14 percent of respondents without income responses into a dummy variable, so they remain in the analysis (see Hardy and Reynolds [2004] on this method). Religious denomination is captured by a categorical variable including the following: no affiliation, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestants and other smaller Christian groups, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and other religions. Other religion is a residual group that includes a variety of religions, none of which had a substantial following in any country.
The following variables are considered at the macro level (see table A2 for actual values). In order to test our hypotheses on the influence of ties to world society (H1, H3c, and H4b), the commonly used indicator "logged count of International Non-Governmental organizations (INGO)" is included. It is defined as the "number of organizations of which a country or a territory is a member, whether directly or through the presence of members in that country" (UIA 2003 (UIA , 2008 (UIA & 2013 .
In order to test hypotheses on polarizing factors (H2a-b), we developed two indicators of states' international alignment. The first captures states' UN voting records in respect to human rights and sexual orientation, based on six separate votes conducted in the UN General Assembly's Third Committee (November 22, 2002 , November 16, 2010 , and December 21, 2010 , the Human Rights Council (July 14, 2012, and September 26, 2014) , and a vote on recognition of same-sex relationships among UN staff in the UN General Assembly's Fifth Committee (March 24, 2015) . We have measured this variable across three waves (wave 1 includes the 2002 vote; wave 2 includes the three votes conducted between 2010 and 2012; wave 3 includes the two votes conducted after 2012). Each wave is coded as follows: states that always vote in support of protecting SOGI rights are coded as 1, whereas 0.5 indicates a mix of supportive votes and non-attendance/abstention, 0 indicates no vote cast (abstain or non-attendance), −0.5 a mix of against and non-attendance/abstention, and −1 always against. In our sample there was only one case where a country voted both for and against SOGI rights in the same wave, and we have also coded this combination of votes as 0.
9 The second variable considers the country's international affiliation. This was captured through an indicator contrasting UN LGBT Core Group membership with membership in the OIC (which has campaigned against SOGI rights and which includes both most Muslim-majority states and several states whose Muslim population is a sizeable minority, e.g., Kenya and Uganda), status as a former communist state (generally reflective of increased influence from the Russian Federation and a legal system based on the Soviet model; see Frank and Moss [2017] ), and the residual group of states that fall outside these categories. Furthermore, we also consider the domestic laws measured as legal status of homosexuality 10 (legal yes/no; ILGA [2016] ). We consider the following control variables at the macro level (see also table A2): level of social globalization taken from the KOF index, which measures the spread of information, ideas, and people on a scale from 0 to 100 (Dreher 2006) ; affluence measured in GDP per capita in current US dollars (World Bank 2015); democratization as the "institutionalized democracy" score, with a range from 0 to 10, taken from the Polity Project (2015); and finally, dominant societal religion captures the size of the main group or in the case of Canada, Czech Republic, and Korea, where the majority of respondents reported no religion, the historically dominant religion. The main groups are: Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, and East Asian religions. Given the small statistical power and country sample size, the multilevel model only presents the results of a variable with a reduced number of groups that compares Catholic, Muslim, and Orthodox countries with the remaining countries (which were combined, as the regression did not indicate significant cross-societal differences).
These variables are analyzed using multilevel regressions. Given that our data is nested-individuals within countries, at three different time points, with different respondents in each wave-we decided to use a multilevel approach with countries as level three, country-wave observations as level two, and individuals within a given wave as level one (see Fairbrother [2014] ). These models include relatively time-invariant country-level variables (such as dominant religion) at level three and country variables that change across the three waves (wealth differences, increasing numbers of INGOs, etc.) at level two (see table A2 for leveltwo and -three variables). In order to distinguish between cross-sectional effects and longitudinal effects of these level-two variables, their average score across all waves also has to be included at level three. Individual responses, finally, are included as level-one variables (see table A1 ). Further, given that our dependent variable is dichotomous, a logistic hierarchical regression with a logit link is used. This type of regression assumes that the level-one random effect is standard logistic distributed conditional on the upper-level random effects. Upperlevel random effects are considered normally distributed. Variance at level one equals 1, so only the remaining variances at levels two and three are presented in the results. Table 1 shows acceptance of homosexuality in different countries, sorted by absolute level of acceptance in the latest available data wave. The greatest acceptance in 2013/11 (at least 80 percent) is in Spain and Germany, followed by Canada and the Czech Republic. The lowest rates are in Pakistan, Jordan, Ghana, Egypt, and Indonesia, where 2 to 3 percent of the respondents agree that homosexuality should be accepted.
Results
These countries' rankings reflect previous findings on the association between indicators such as development, wealth, and democracy and public acceptance. Levels of acceptance also correspond with states' UN voting behavior. Acceptance is fairly high in the United States (60 percent pro) and low in Russia (16 percent pro), where, after a period of liberalization in the immediate postCold War period, politicians have become international promoters of the traditional world model. Finally, no OIC member country records acceptance above 9 percent in 2013.
Considering the total changes over time, acceptance remains rather stable at the aggregate level. The means of the country averages are 40 percent in the first and the last waves and around 39 percent in the middle wave (41 percent, 40 percent, and 42 percent when considering only the countries that took part in all three waves). Despite overall stability of aggregate public opinion across our sample, there are several clear trends in some countries, which will be discussed later. We should also add that we know from surveys such as the World Values Survey that our period of investigation (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) was preceded by a period of lower acceptance in many now-tolerant countries (Inglehart, Ponarin, Inglehart 2017) . Figure 2 presents similar information graphically. The horizontal axis displays current public opinion and shows a rough division into two groups: countries with low acceptance are predominantly post-communist or members of the OIC. Acceptance was comparatively high in most members of the LGBT Core Group (the lowest was 40 percent in Israel). The vertical axis shows the recent change in attitudes toward homosexuality (since 2007 in all countries, except for Pakistan, South Africa, and the Philippines, for which 2002 is used). Trends toward reduced acceptance can be seen in the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and in many OIC member-states. Furthermore, France shows a negative trend from a high base, which is likely influenced by the divisive national debate surrounding the socialist government's efforts to recognize same-sex marriage in 2012. Strong homo-positive shifts can be found in most Western and Latin American countries and a few that have experienced comparatively rapid economic development, such as South Korea. The Philippines, which recorded 73 percent acceptance in 2013, stands out as a low-income state that has both a high level of acceptance and a significant increasing trend.
Multilevel Results
The descriptive findings presented in the previous section suggest some influence from political, cultural, and other factors on both the magnitude of acceptance and its change over time. However, since we have not yet considered the underlying individual determinants of acceptance, this section tests the influence of individual characteristics and country-level factors on attitudes in 30 countries using hierarchical regressions. We first test the "standard" world society model of effects due to the presence of international organizations and possible mediation effects of individual variables. Table 2 presents the results of these models and reports the B values, standard errors, significance, and the remaining variances. Mediation-an indicator of a transfer of global ideas via individual variables-is investigated by considering the effects of the independent variable INGO on acceptance (model 1), the effects of the individual-level mediators on the dependent variable (model 2), and the combined effects of these variables on the dependent variable (model 3). The results of additional models that estimate the effects of INGOs on the mediating variables are reported in the text only. According to this logic, full mediation occurs if the effects of INGOs diminish when individual variables are included.
Model 1 includes the intercept and three predictors-a variable for the survey wave, the average density of INGO ties in a given country, and the changing density of INGOs in a given country. Among these, only the average number of ties is significant. Acceptance thus is higher in countries that are strongly embedded in world society; however, it is not affected significantly by changing density of INGO ties over time. M1 presents a rather static picture. However, it does not yet consider differentiated trends, which are analyzed later. Model 2 shows the effects of different micro-level variables. Findings that better-educated individuals and younger individuals are more accepting confirm our hypothesis that these variables affect exposure to global ideas. Similarly, the results support our claim that embedding in religious groups lowers acceptance, as adherents of all religions (except Judaism) are less accepting than the reference group of respondents without a religious affiliation. The control variables show that women are more accepting than male respondents, that acceptance is associated positively with income, and that respondents who reported their income are more accepting than those who did not. Model 3 tests the combined effects of ties to world society and individuallevel variables. In line with the statistical idea of mediation, the B value of the INGO variable (country level) drops when combined with our individual-level variables. However, given that a direct effect of INGO density remains, we can only speak of partial mediation by individual-level variables. Further tests considering the effects of the country-level variable INGO on individual-level variables show that only age and religious denominations are significantly affected and thus mediate global ideas.
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In sum, the models presented in table 2 support some of our hypotheses, but qualify others. Ties to world society via INGOs are positively associated with acceptance (H1a). Their growth, however, does not have a significant influence. Concerning H3a-c, all individual-level variables have direct effects, but only religious denomination and age also work as mediators of world models.
Testing the effects of polarizing drivers
This article's main finding, establishing divergence in world society, was confirmed in our descriptive analysis. We next seek to extend the common WS model, consider polarizing factors at the macro level, and test the effects of potential contributors to polarization on individual acceptance of homosexuality. These models are presented in table 3, which shows these variables' effects at the country level and within countries over time, as well as the remaining variances at both levels. Each model is estimated separately and includes the named predictors and all micro-level predictors of table 2.
Models including characteristics that change over time, such as the number of INGO ties, include three macro-level predictors: the survey wave, the national cross-wave average of the variable of interest at the country level, and the variable of interest at the over-time level. We can thus can examine both crosssectional differences between countries and over-time effects within countries. Furthermore, models that include societal characteristics (e.g., dominant societal religion) that remained unchanged across the three waves allow us to consider changes within these categories via an interaction with the survey wave variable.
Model 1 repeats the macro-level findings reported in table 2 and thus captures the effects of ties to world society via INGOs. It shows that respondents in countries with many ties are more accepting (B = 1.527**), whereas changes in the number of ties over time (B = −0.459) as well as the overall change over time (B = 0.046) are not significant. Finally, it also reports the remaining variances at the country level (0.701**) and time level (0.112**), which can used to compare the explanatory power of the different models.
Model 2 considers the effects of UN voting patterns and indicates that a country's overall stance is associated with public opinion in the sense that individuals in countries that vote in favor of homosexuality are also more accepting. Conversely, respondents in countries that vote against SOGI rights are less accepting. However, at the time level this model also fails to find significant effects. Similarly, model 3, which considers the international affiliation of a country in terms of pro-SOGI voting patterns, shows that the acceptance is significantly lower in OIC member countries than in the LGBT Core Group. It also shows that public opinion becomes less accepting over time in OIC countries and thus indicates ongoing polarization. Turning next to the domestic legal status of homosexuality, model 4 indicates that acceptance is low in countries that criminalize homosexuality. However, criminal laws do not have significant effects over time.
The subsequent models consider the effects of our control variables. Model 5 considers the dominant societal religion and shows that acceptance is highest in Catholic countries and lowest in Islamic countries. Furthermore, acceptance is declining over time in Orthodox and Muslim countries, and increasing in other countries. Models 6, 7, and 8 consider the effects of GDP per capita, social globalization, and democracy and find that acceptance is generally higher in affluent, globally connected, and democratic countries. Over time, however, these variables have negative effects. Putting these two effects together-also by interactions-we find that homophobia has increased in countries that increased from low levels of affluence, democracy, or global embedding.
In sum, models 1-8 point to both persistent differences between countries and trends over time leading to increased polarization. At this point, however, we note that the effects of macro-level variables are not yet controlled for each other. We thus combined these predictors in various ways and tested the variables' significance in these combinations (see Appendix). The main outcomes, presented in model 9, show that the effects of INGOs (p = 0.109) and voting pattern at the UN level (p < 0.05) remain substantial at the country level when controlled for other variables. Meanwhile, domestic criminalization became insignificant and so is not included. A country's international affiliation is also not significant for absolute levels of acceptance. However, international affiliation does interact significantly with the time variable and shows that these groups of countries moved in opposing directions over time-with respondents in post-communist countries and OIC members becoming less accepting, while respondents in the other countries became more accepting. As for the controls, only social globalization remained significant in the final model and indicates that acceptance is higher in more globally connected countries.
Testing for alignment with the dominant world models
We now examine alignment between individuals and the nationally dominant world model over time, and the alignment between INGOs' influence and nationally dominant cultural views. For this purpose, we added interactions between the survey wave and individual variables (see table 4 and figure 3 ) and between the dominant cultural view and ties to world society (reported in the text).
Considering interactions with time presented in table 4, significant results can be reported for age and education. These interactions suggest that these variables' effects become smaller over time, as can be seen in figure 3 , which displays the predicted B values for respondents with an age and education of +/− one standard deviation from the mean value. The differences between younger and older respondents as well as between more and less educated respondents thus decline over time. In order to test for cohort effects, we also ran models with both year of birth and 10-year cohort groups as independent variables. These All macrolevel variables displayed in model 9, table 3, are included. The effects are similar, only the main effect of the time variable is not significant anymore due to the new interactions. Significance: + p < 0.1 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05. Data source: Pew Global Attitudes Surveys. models indicate some differences between cohorts, but also that differences between cohorts decline over time. Our findings are thus in line with Anderson and Fetner's (2008) work showing that US opinion change concerning homosexuality was occurring both through age effects, and through attitude change within cohorts. In sum, although the aggregate change between waves is statistically insignificant when considering the entire sample, cohorts' attitudes did shift between waves in many individual countries. These findings on age and cohort effects suggest that differences within societies have diminished over time, and that individuals of all ages have become more aligned with their country's dominant world model. Concerning religious affiliations, no interaction is significant at the 0.05 level. The differentiating power of religious micro institutions remains stable over time. We thus conclude that the exposure variables age and education lose differentiating power over time, whereas religious denominations gain importance in relative terms. These results support H4a (on alignment) only as far as exposure variables are concerned.
Finally, we added an interaction between average acceptance in a society (as a proxy for the degree of tolerance) and the country-level variable of INGO density. The main effect of acceptance is 12.1; the main effect of INGOs is 0.145; and the interaction is −0.870. The interaction is significant and indicates that effects of INGO presence are weaker in less liberal societies. This finding supports H4b on the alignment between dominant cultural views and effects of ties to world society via INGOs.
Discussion and Conclusions
This article aimed to improve our knowledge of conflicting world models within world society by, first, updating existing WS literature on the regulation of homosexuality and, then, studying how world models influence individual acceptance of homosexuality, as captured by Pew Global Attitudes Survey data from three waves (2002, 2007, and 2013) . Our key finding is that polarization is occurring at the world level: increasing divergence in national regulation of homosexuality is mirrored by divergence in public opinion between countries.
First, we found that the secular global trend toward increasingly liberal regulation of homosexuality depicted by Frank, Boutcher, Camp (2009) is continuing (see figure 1) . However, we also found evidence of an emerging countertrend toward tougher legal penalties in some regions, which was not captured in previous literature. This supports claims of polarization in world society (Symons and Altman 2015) . Are world society forces also prompting polarization within public opinion? Our descriptive analysis reveals that polarization among states is mirrored in public attitudes. Public opinion across countries is diverging-a trend that is obscured by an overall stable mean value of attitudes to homosexuality between 2002 and 2013. This finding led us to extend existing research on the diffusion of world models to the individual level. Whereas earlier studies presumed the dominance of liberal world models (Boyle, McMorris, and Gomez 2002; Hadler 2012; Velitchkova 2015) , we find that illiberal world models are increasingly influential. Further, it appears that the OIC and post-Soviet worlds offer alternatives to liberal world culture.
In order to shed some light on the causes of divergence, we tested the influence of various diffusion promoters discussed within WS. At a very basic level, our analysis confirms previous studies that find that the density of national level ties with world society influences individual attitudes (Hadler 2012; Marquart-Pyatt 2012; Zhou 2013) . However, our results also confirm that a state's alignment with world cultural divisions, as captured by UN voting patterns, also shapes public opinion. National laws criminalizing homosexuality seemed to matter initially, but lost significance once we controlled for other macro-level variables.
Furthermore, increased INGO presence generally correlates with higher acceptance; however, in societies with low overall acceptance, this relationship reverses. This supports the idea that international public opinion might polarize during an initial period when a takeoff issue is first debated publicly (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007) .
These effects undergird a polarization in aggregate public opinion internationally that correlates with states' positions on SOGI (as depicted in figure 2) . Tests of interaction between international group affiliation and time support our hypothesis that patterns of change in domestic opinion will correlate with states' international alignment. Between 2002 and 2013, there was an ongoing decline in individual acceptance of homosexuality within OIC members; after 2007, as the international debate over SOGI rights gained prominence, we observe a decline in former communist states and a continuing high level of acceptance within members of the UN LGBT Core Group.
Overall, these findings go well beyond previous studies' findings that international organizations and ties to the global level have a direct and ubiquitous effect on individuals. Further, given the frequently proposed distinction between global forces and endogenous societal factors such as economic modernization, democracy, and cultural background (Boyle, McMorris, Gomez 2002) , we must also ask how these factors mediate the influence of WS. While we have not identified causal mechanisms, our results suggest that two "modernization" indicatorsdemocracy and wealth-explain much variation in national acceptance and even render many differences due to dominant societal religions insignificant (see Appendix). For example, although majority-Islamic countries record the least public acceptance of homosexuality, there is no "Islamic effect"-not to be confused with OIC membership-at a country level when we control for democracy and wealth. Given endogenous societal factors' strength, future research scrutinizing differences in attitudes should consider both WS and modernization factors.
Turning next to individual attributes' influence, our analysis confirms that the "exposure" variables education and age (youth) are both associated with greater acceptance. The positive effect of education accords with WS theorists' claim that individuals are exposed to world models through education (see Hadler [2016] ; Pierotti [2013] ; Velitchkova [2015] ; Zhou [2013] ). Yet, we were unable to identify any mediation of INGO effects via education. Since our data does not fully capture the content of education, such as the world models reflected in textbooks or curricula, perhaps it does not adequately test education's role. Regardless, this finding calls for further scrutiny, as it contradicts the claim of mediation via education. Conversely, embeddedness in religious groups (a micro-institution) has both direct and mediating effects. Respondents without affiliation are the most accepting, whereas adherents of different religions are less accepting in various degrees. Although we have not investigated causal mechanisms, this finding is consistent with social identity theory's suggestion that attitudinal polarization might play a role in buttressing group identity within confessional minorities (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008) . In addition, these findings support the claim that exposure to contradictory micro-logics can impede dispersion of world models (Velitchkova 2015) .
While the findings largely support our hypotheses, our study's limitations suggest potential directions for future work. First, our results suggest differences between religious groups, but it was beyond this paper's scope to explain why different religious affiliations have different impacts. For example, given Catholic doctrine's hostility toward homosexuality, it is hard to explain why dominant-Catholic countries saw large shifts toward acceptance between 2002 and 2013. Future work might investigate causal mechanisms and explore a wider range of subnational institutions and identities.
Our investigation of INGOs' influence has similar limitations. While our data measures the ties to world society, it does not reveal which INGOs are present or what kind of work they do. We have established a moderation effect between organizations and their context in the sense that INGOs have negative effects on acceptance in societies with an overall low acceptance of homosexuality, whereas their effect is positive in more permissive societies. Future research might disaggregate the impacts of specific types of NGOs in different contexts.
While we have established that a heterogeneous world society can influence national opinion, one swallow does not make a summer. Since our analysis focuses exclusively on homosexuality, we cannot suggest whether homosexuality is an atypical flashpoint in global cultural conflict or an indicator of broader cultural divisions. Evidence of growing group-level differences in opinion (consolidation) may raise the probability of ongoing cultural conflict (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996, 693) . Future research might compare attitudinal change across multiple issues, compare multiple highly contested issues (e.g., Boyle 2005) , analyze national cohort-effects in detail (Anderson and Fetner 2008) , and investigate how public opinion shapes states' participation in WS as well as how WS influences public opinion. Our preliminary analysis of microlevel processes should also be pushed further to test hypotheses concerning specific frames or logics (e.g., Boyle, Minzee, and Longhofer 2015) . Future research should also develop more fine-grained techniques for analyzing the mechanisms by which WS influence is accepted or rejected by individuals.
Finally, future research may explore whether contemporary divergence reflects a short-term backlash, or a move toward institutionalization of Eisenstadt's "multiple modernities" (2000) . We know that backlashes following early debates over gay and lesbian rights eventually waned in the Americas and Europe (e.g., Ayoub 2014; Dorf and Tarrow 2014) . This evidence suggests the possibility that indicators we have interpreted as an illiberal global movement may be better understood as a backlash arising as countries debate homosexuality in the public sphere for the first time. However, since acceptance of homosexuality is linked to high levels of physical and economic security (Inglehart, Ponarin, and Inglehart 2017) , backlashes in low-income countries may not resolve rapidly. Moreover, Phillip Ayoub's work, which establishes that visibility has driven institutional acceptance of LGBT rights in Europe, has troubling implications for less visible sexual minorities (2016).
The medium-term trajectory of polarization may also be contingent on domestic developments in key states such as the United States and Russia. At the time of writing, the Trump Administration's position in international debates over sexuality remains slightly unclear; however, the United States is no longer an active international proponent of the liberal world model concerning homosexuality. The implications of this abrupt change are unclear. However, if the salience of homosexuality in national and international political discourse were to reduce, it is possible that this might also reduce polarizing pressures. Notes 1. World society can refer to the sociological theory "World Society"-which encompasses research into both the state-centric and civil society dimensions of the global institutional order (Cole [2017] has proposed the terms "World Polity" and "World Society" to distinguish these two dimensions). It can also refer to the global coalescence of world models, ideas, and organizations, whose influence on organizations and actors is conceptualized within this theory. The abbreviation WS is used when referring to the sociological theory of world society. 2. Our analysis of public opinion and national laws focuses on dispersion (variance), which is the most widely utilized indicator of polarization (see Evans, Bryson, and DiMaggio 2001) . However, we also consider consolidation, which is another of the four dimensions of polarization identified by DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson (1996, 694-98) : dispersion, bimodality, constraint, and consolidation. 3. We thank David Frank for sharing this data. 4. Malawi criminalized lesbian sex for the first time. 5. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 6. We also considered WVS data, which shows similar country differences and trends.
However, our need to connect each wave to events made WVS data, which is collected over up to five years, unsuitable. 7. We ignored the 2011 wave in all other countries, as both time-points (2013 and 2011) indicate a similar change in attitudes when compared to 2007 and 2002. Notably, differences can be reported only for France (discussed in text), Pakistan, and Mexico. A peak in acceptance in Pakistan in 2011 is due to shifts in the "refused" replies, whereas the "not be accepted" option shows constant growth since 2002. In Mexico, a low level of acceptance in 2011 seems to be an outlier, as the general trend in Mexico is positive over time (see (http://www.parametria.com. mx/carta_parametrica.php?cp=4599). 8. For more info, see http://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/international-surveyresearch/ (accessed July 26, 2017). 9. South Africa (ZA) voted "against" in the Third Committee on November 16, 2010, and "for" the following month. In the earlier vote, ZA voted in support of an African Group resolution only after first calling for the vote to be canceled and replaced with an international dialogue. Across the three waves, ZA cast 3 pro votes, 1 contra and 2 abstentions. Thus, at level three we coded it as slightly in favor of SOGI rights. 10. We also considered the numerical variable "number of years legal" and the categorical variable "not legal, became legal after WW2, and legal since before WW2." Neither measure was significant. 11. The effects of the wave variable INGO on individual variables were not tested, as this growth variable did not affect acceptance. Mediation thus can be ruled out. The values for all UN variables, international affiliations, and democracy are estimated, as this country is not a member of the UN and no democracy score was reported in the polity data, respectively. All models presented in this paper were thus estimated twice-with and without Palestine. The results were almost identical.
b
Sources: See the data and methods section.
c These variables are included as level-two and -three variables in our multilevel models. All variables thus reflect contextual characteristics, which may influence the individual acceptance of homosexuality, in addition to the individual-level variables depicted in table A1 (see the methods section for details).
